The "Air Operation":
A Warsaw Pact Strategy for
Achieving Air Superiority q
An Intelligence Avtcsunenl
Information available as of SI Aupxil was used ia the preparation of this report
The author of lhi< panci
Office of Strategic Research
A ;n, the jssttumc ol
| 0SR. Comments and quoics are welcome
This paper wis coordinated with the Office ol Weapons Ifltdlitcncc and wilh (he National Intelligence Officer for <ier*ril Purpose
The "Air Operation":
A Warsaw Pact Strategy for
Achieving Air SuperiorityT"
KeyPact planners consider thai early air superiority is criticalheir
chances for victoryar with NATO Believing thai the first stage ofar may be fought wilh conventional forces only, they have developed plansarge-scale, thcatcrwidc. conventional air offensive intended lo achieve superiority in the first few days ofar. The Soviets refer lo Ihis offensive as the "Air Operation."
Some aspects of the Air Operation arc known:
The Pact would commit most of its tactical aircraft and many of its Long Range Aviation (LRA) bomberscries of air assaults
The first wave in each assault would be intended to destroy or suppress NATO's air defense in certain corridors. Subsequent waves would fly through these corridors to strike airfields and air-associated command and control facilities.
LRA bombers would be the primary force for attacking airfields. Most ol" the tactical air forces would be used to suppress the air defenses, especially (he HAWK missile batteries.
Some aircrafi would be withheld for nuclear operations, and relatively few would be assigned lo the direct support of the ground forces.
The Air Operation would not achieve air superiority, in our judgment, although it would do considerable damage tw NATO's air defenses. Wc base this conclusion on the following evaluation of Pact capabilities;
The Pact is unlikely to achieve stiatcgic surprise; to enhance the prospectseneral offensive in Central Europe it would feel compelled to make extensive preparations, which NATO would detect.
The Pact's ability to orchestrate precisely limed multiplevarious categories of aircraft under diffcreniopenuestion.
Wuh their current weapons, the Pad's tactical aircrews would have difficulty suppressing NATO's IIAWKs.
Paci could do only limited damage to NATO airfields, because ihe force il apparently intends to commit lo this task is inadequate, the weapons ineffective, and the lactic? faulty.
aiicrews generally are not well trained for combatostile environment.
Pad lacticalcurrentlyperforin their mission unless they have high ceilings and good visibility
Top Reccn
1 op Slcret
Judgments
Air Operation Concepi
Affecting the Availability of Forces
of Aircraft to Other Missions
Movement Before Hostilities
tbe Air Operation
Preparation
Operations
Affecting Pact Prospects for Success
orces 8
of NATO Air Defense 8
of the Airfield Auack
Proficiency
Rates
in Air-To-Air Combai
Warsaw Pact Capabilities for HAWK Suppression
(
Warsaw Pact Capabilities for Conventional Air Attacks Against NATO Airfields
Figures
Pact Air Operation 2
Simulated Suppression oFnatCVs Forward HAWKs by Pact
FollowupStrikes by Pact
Typical NATO
Aircraft Shelter
Fighter-Bomber Attack on a
Fighter-Bomber Attack on
Attack on aAttack on
Required To Repair Runway
tables
Pact Combat Aircraft Available for Use in Central Europe
Allocation of Pact Aircraft to Initial Air Operation in Central Europe
Allocation of Pact Sirike Forces in the TACOS Simulations
of Pact Electronic Warfare Systems
Data on Selected Soviet Missiles
of TACOS Simulation of the HAWK Suppression Engagement
Aircraft Loss Rate
Operation Delivery Conditionstoii
Capability To Attack Runways
Capability To Attack Shelters
of Pact Air Opeialion Assault
op Swvn'l
Preface
This paper presents evidence from t
J3nd unclassified documents to show how planning for the Air Operation has evolved and assesses ihe Pact's current ability to carry oul the operation. Il does nol discuss future capabilities, except lo idcnlify areas in which Ihe Pad is already making improvements. Tbe analysis focusesonventional air attack against those NATO targets in Centraland air defense facilities-thai ihe Warsaw Pact would have to destroy if it were to achieve air superiority. Wc do not consider the Pact's ability to destroy otheras nuclear storage sites and surface-io-surfaceattempt to calculate the aircraft each side may lose in air-to-air combat, (f-
In sum, this paper presents our analysis of the damage that NATO could expectassive Pactairstrike against ils air forces and air defenses in Ihe near term. Wc believe this paperorst -cisc situation for NATOl
"Vo2dushnaya operaisiya (aircombatr one or severaland field forces, conductedin cooperation with other branches ofingle aim and plan, to achieveor operational objective
"An air operation will be characterized by theof forces and facilities, theof ihe objectives, and great spacialimportance is attached to the clementin an air operation, which is achievedpreparations for it, selecting (helime for carrying out the firstand timely suppression and destructionmeans of detection and control ofair defense system
"Interaction among the operational field forces and formations taking part in an air operation is achieved by allocating the missions and objectives among them and coordinating the time and procedure Tor delivering the strikes, as well as by raking steps in support of the combat operations "
Ye. G. Vcraksa and M. N. Kozlievnikov Soviet Military6
oidukhe (airecisive superiority over the enemy by the aviation of one of the belligerents in the airspaceheater of military operations or on an important axis. The gaining of air supremacy makes it possible for the ground forces, the navy, air forces, and rearation (coalilion of nations) to perform their tasks without significant interference from the enemy's aviation or air
"The need to achieve and retain air supremacy remains an important task. In order to accomplish it the enemy's air grouping (groupings) as well as the main resources must be destroyed and the air defense system neutralized in one theater of militaryor in several simultaneously. The air force has Ihe main role in the achievement and retention of air supremacy, although other branches of armed forces also participate in the struggle for air supremacy. Air supremacy may be strategic, operational,actical, depending on theEmphasis added]
A. N. Yefimov
Soviet Military6
lop S*
The "Air Operation":
A Warsaw Pact Strategy for
Achieving Air Superiority
Soviet strategy for war with NATO callsassive and rapid ground offensive into Central Europe1 to defeat NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, and seize or destroy ports and airfields to prevent reinforcement. Pact planners regard the early attainment of air superiority as critical, and they intend to carryarge-scale, theaterwide conventional air offensive in order to achieve air superiority in the first daysar.Q
Tbe Air Operation Concept
Plannine for tlie initial air offensive is based on what the Soviets call (he "Airoviet military writers use this term to describe the combined use of air units from severalexample, from the air armies of two or more fronts and from Lone Range Aviation (LRA) under Centralized control above the front level totrategic objective assigned by the High Command, j j
The Air Operation is intended louperior command to assume temporary control of the various tactical air armies in pursuitommon objective. The concept, which was developed dunng World War II, isan of Soviet doctrine because of the decentralized structure of the Pact's tactical air forces These forces are normally parceled out to the various front commanders to provide air support as required by "front operations"^
The details of Air Operation contingency plansPact may Currently have on (he shelf ateHowever,uman
sources, and unclassified military writings we can
' In ihi* assessment. Ike tcrmCcnlial Europe it used loimludc llic NATO Guidelinestail *nc Weil Germany. Pound. Cut ho Slovakia, and Bcnclail plus Dcnnuik
determine their objectives and principalThe following combat operations make up the Air Operation:
defense suppression phase, involving the jamming and destruction of NATO airborne and ground-based air defenses.
rimary strike phase, consisting of attacks against NATO airfields and command and control facilities.
noststrikc reconnaissance
The most detailed evidence on (he conduct of the Air Operation is provided by scenarios thai wc believe were formulated by the Soviets as part of overall Pact strategic planning. (One such scenario is shown inhe scenarios are similarumber of ways
Assaults consist of sequential sorties,irst wave by tactical aviation for the suppression of NATO air defenses and several subsequent waves by tactical air forces and LRA.
The targets to be struck arc usually identical and include HAWK surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, air defense command and control facilities, and airfields.
LRA is limned primarily ro attacking
The scenarios do notlear indication of Soviet intentions regarding reinforcement of Pact air foices in Central Europe with aircraft from the western Soviet Union. Two types of scenario 1| 1 |
in one ihe participating air forces would have
required extensive reinforcement from the Soviet Union, and in Ihe other (he participating forces could have conducted the operation with little or no
rousmfm
Warsaw Pad Air Operation scenario
(bo Availability of Force*
ihr Paci has moreombai aircraft available lor use in Central Europe-adical aircraft, including ibose based in the western USSR,ast European air defenseand moreoviet medium bombers (seeI the Air Operation were put into effect, tbe number act nails committed to it would be deteimincd by the number of aircraft moved forward from the
USSR and the number allocated toother missions Q
'Oui fiivtu. Mid en Winnies. *rt timidodk Mildo
IWMIin MMr lo mainuia IDUUlf ac) (ram
ulkk ia inohtr.
Allocation of Aircraft to Other Miuiont Although most of the Pact'saircrafl would be involved in the Air Operation, some would be reserved (or other lypes of missions, including strategic air defense o) Eastern Europe, maintenanceudear-armod response force, and direct air support to the front commanders for front operations
The actual commitment of aircraft would varyint lo condilsom in Ceatral Europe at tbe time and cannot be predicted in other than general terms We do
Table I
Warsaw Pacl Combai Aircraft Available for Use In Central Europe
I (p* of Aircraft
F*ror*'
USSR'
fithitn
atuck
defease
bombers
Paeiforces bud in I'aii (icimiiif. Poland, and Cxechuslovatia.
airW BaliK. BeImsniian. and Carpuhian Military Oiiirieu
'od- in ihe
SmUmcMmrnaadi
many
have information, however, thai Indicate would be allocated toother missions:
Strategic air defense is the responsibility of tbe East European national air defense elements. Thus,on-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) interceptorswould not be used in offensive operations.
AIedium bombersactical aircraft would be withheld from conventionaltouclear force.
inimum.ercent of the remaining tactical aviation force would be under control of the front commanders for direct support of ground operations
These allocations wouldaximumircraft for the Air Operation Our analysis suggests that the Pact probably would assign
Aircraft Movement Hefoee llotlitititi
The Pact has various options in the deployment of aircraft, which would affect ihe number of aircraft that could be involved in the Air Operation. The in-place option would be to use those forces that are able io attack NATO targets from their peacetime loca-tums. and the full reinforcement option would be to
bring forward all the Pact tactical aircraft based oul of range of NATO targets and commit them lo the operation Somewhere between lies the option lhat wc consider the Pact most likely lo choose. The number of aircraft available in each option is shown in table 2
In-Place Option Pact air forces could use the in-pleee option iostanding start" auack againsthe number of aircraft would be limited to those which the planners consider to have sufficient range to attach NATO targets from their home bases. The time required to prepare for this option- -aboutours would give NATO virtually no warning of attack, lt would also give Ihe Pact air forces too little time to complete the logistics and command and control preparations which Ihey believe Ihey would need fora sustained, effective air operation
hull Reinforcement Option. The full reinforcement option would make available Ihe maximum number ol aircraft. Tbe time required to prepare for it-ermit the Pact to compleie its initial air logistics and command and control preparations Soviet plannersignificant drawback to this option, however the forward area does not have enough hangarettcs to protect the newly arrived aircraft, which would be vulnerableATO preemptive strike. The planners may also be concerned about stripping second-echelon fronts of their air support before ihe ground armies could be brought inlo Ihe theater.
The Soviets probably would consider using the full reinforcement optionartully prepared ground offensive In such an offeaaive. the three fronts from East Germany. Czechoslovakia. and Poland would be committed to ihe attack, and the Iwo fronts from the western USSR would be brought forward and made available from the outset as theater reserves Although the air elements for such an attack could be ready inours, the planners arc apparently
Nationalanon-rott CapoMttmfor Going to War in Europe: InplUiliont/or HAWof War.hfcuttioa ol the "rtaodiac mil" undnd five -Front it lack Mena riot and tnf likelihood ol their
lop
*:er<l
logistics Preparations. Activation of airbascs lotaciical air units deploying nearer NATO borders would involve extensive movement of logistic materials, support personnel, and equipment. Pact exercises indicate that tactical air units already in Central Europe would use motor transport for this movement and would lake aboulours. Longer hauls, such as those required lo move the supporting elementsight bomber division from the USSR into East Germany, probably would be made by air transport.ove would require approximately im ANub flights and would takeaboulours.
Intelligence Preparations. The Pact would have to acquire and process intelligence on NATO forces before ihe Air Operation, especially if NATO had been alerted. It almost certainly would attempt to learn the location of any air defense and surface-to-surface missile units that had moved from their peacetime positions. It would also try to identify ihe airfields used for dispersal, especially of nuclear-capable uniis. To accomplish these tasks, the Pact has agent networks in NATO countries, ground-based SIGINT nctworks.and aircraft equipped for ELINT. COMINT, and radarand phoiographicMost Of ihe airborne reconnaissance would be flowntandoff mode wiihout penetrating NATO airspace, but some penetration wilh manned aircraft is likely.
a
Combat Operations
Jamming. The Pact would depend heavily on airborne as well as ground-based electronic countermcasures (ECM) to reduce losses while penetrating NATO airspace. Defense suppression attacks would beginassive, coordinated jamming effort aimed at disrupting the radars and the communications links of NATO's air defenses
Pact ground force ECM uniis and air force MI-8PP helicopters probably would conceniraic on the UH l: ground-to-air and air-to-air communications that NATO uses to control its interceptor operations. Their ECM is effective only along the line of sight, however, and their effectiveness against NATO radars would probably be limited.^
The jamming of NATO's variousground-controlled intercept, and acquisition-would be the responsibility of aircraft (such as the) carrying ECM equipment. ?=
flcOlUSC
of its vulnerability, this aircralt probaoiy would be used only for standoff jamming, but even so. when orbiting over East Germany and Czechoslovakiaeters it could cover most or the ground-based radars in West Gcrtnanyp |
Allacks Against HAWK Batteries. In the initial phase or the Air Operation, attacks would be made against NATO's air defenses. The Pact probably would choose to suppress the defenses within certain corridors; this would eliminate the need to suppress allf Ihe HAWK batteries NATO has currently deployed in Central Europe and would allow more Pact aircralt to be directed against primary targets. If. lor example, three corridors were to be established, onlyoAWK sites would have to be suppressed orOn Ihe basis or current Pact planning factors, this number of sites would requiteighter-bomber sorties. NATO's Nike-Hercules sites probably would nol be subjected toa major suppression effort, ai least during ihis initial phase.| |
Taciical aircraft attacking HAWK units probably would go after their fire-control radars and associated electronics vans, using unguided bombs and rockets as well as precision-guided munitions. They could also use theerry tactical air-to-surface missile, but its effectiveness would be limited. (Its accuracy is poor, and the carrying aircraft must linger in the area -becoming highlyorder to guide the weapon to itsheactical antiradiation homing missile also appears to be of little use in attacking HAWK sites, |
]Conle-
qucntly. theould be able io engage tne HAWK's high-altitude acquisition radar, but not its more important low-altitude acquisition radar, high-power illuminator, and range-only
Too/Secret
Against Radar Silts. Pact planners probably would alsoeed lo attack allf NATO's for ward-deployed NADGF. primary early warning ground-control radaiiiven Pad planningthis could require as manyighter-bomber sorties. Whether any of theacilities that make up NATO's lactkal air control system (TACS) would also come under attack in the initial assault would depend on whether Pact reconnaissance had locaicd them. UnlikelXlh facilities, wbicb are id fued positions, the TACS facilities can be retocaied.Ihe TACS sites are intended primarily for control of offensive operations by NATO's air forces, they could conlrol air defense interceptor operations if NADGE sites were destroyed.
Pact ground force tactical surface-to-surface rockets and missiles probably would supplement the defense suppression strikes by laclical aviation. Thend thepossibly thecarry conventional dusier warheads and could be used against an defense radar sites
Altacks Against Airbases. The main strike force, consisting of medium bombers and tactical fighter bombers, would closely follow the defense suppression raids of the tactical air units and would attack the principal objectives-airfields at which aircraftuclear strike mission are based The Pact would targei these aircraft foreasons; because of their potential use in nuclear operations and because they are, in general, NATO's most modem and effective conventional attack aircraft. Willi the Pact's current planningone air regimentach airfield orceedium bombers could attackirfields.
Wc estimate that approximatelyercent ol the attacking medium bomber force would be used to strike airfields and would concentrate on closing or interdicting the runways and uxiways and destroying NATO aircraft oo the ground. The principalmunitions currently in the Pact's inventory and intended for theseilogtamtrogram general purpose bombs The Badger and
'nalrrrri in thw aiKumtni comaim II NATO air deleiue iiowinl crmriximcninlrrc depkiyeri !oi*nd j
Blinder medium bombers could deliverg of bombs from their home bases in the USSR to NATO targets in Central Europe. The Backfire, which is replacing ihc Badger, couldg over the same distance I
The remainingercent of the attacking medium bombers would be committed to support roles, such as electronic warfare or attacks on NATO's earlyradar siles and the air defense missile and artillery units located near airfields. These aircrafi would use both active jamming and chaff to disrupt NATO's radar defenses and would use aniiradialion missiles against the NADGIi and TACS radar sites. ^
While Ihe mam effort of (he Air Operation would be directed against targets in West Germany andPact forces would alsoimited number of airfields on NATO's northern and southern flanks. Evidence suggests, however, lhat Pad planners are not seriously considering strikes against airfields in France and ihe United Kingdom. Wc believe they omit France because Ihcy arc uncertain what tote the Trench would playATO-Pact war. We arc less certain aboul why exercise scenarios omit strikes against the United Kingdoms based there would beimportant targets. Pact planners, however, may have assigned higher priorityumber of targets on the continent -which are also more accessible and therefore nose fewer operational problems II is also possible that live planneis do not appreciate the importance of ihe UK basesATO's military capability. |
ReconnaivvaiKf. Although the Pact would conduct some aerial reconnaissance before and during tbe Air Operation, aeffort would be made immediately alter the bombing attacks to evaluate the operation's success. Afler an assessment of the damage inflicted on NATO and of their own losses, the Paci commanders would decide on the naiurc of succeeding assaults.
The Paci has three primary types of manned aircraft for reconnaissance; ihe. therewer D. and theishbcd H. The Foxbat probably would be used in photograph
Factors Arfectimt Pact Prospects for Success
The initial Air Operation by itself probably could rtoiecisive defeat on NATO's air forces. Il could neutralize an important part of NATO's ground-based air defenses but probably would not destroy anumber of NATO aircraft.
rcrafl. | |
LRA would be unable to replace lost aircraft.
Several variables would affect ihc ability of the Pact's air forces to reduce ihc effectiveness of NATO's air forces Chief among these are:
The degree of surprise achieved.
The skill in coordinaiing multiple Bights by many aircraft
suppression of NATO's air defenses
The effectiveness of ihe attack on NATO airfield*.
The proficiency of Pact aircrews
ability of Pact air forces to perform their missions in poor flying wcaihcr. {
Surprise
The Pact is unlikely to achieve complete, or strategic,o enhance ihc prospects for successeneral offensive in Central Furopc and lo reduce the risk of escalation to nuclear weapons, Pact leaden almost certainly would feel compelled to makepreparations. They would not only mobilize and
'Stro "lining ol wu In tiurope, forfolUr diicimlon of PicLuUcntliwnluipiltc and lit rote in Cuiitl t'urapc. M
largci* deep in NATO icrrilory, while Fishbcd and Brewer aircrafi would cover those nearer Pact borders. Manned aircraft would be supplemented by short-range reconnaissance drones over the border areas.
move the Paci air, ground, and naval forces bui also pui the political, economic, and crvil defense systemsar footing|
Soviet military doctrine for offensive operations em-phasires both the need for surprise and the need for heavy superiority in the main battle area. In general, the Soviets hopechieve both but. if forced lo choose, they are likely loopl for force superiority. This is real, and its benefits are certain, while surprise is less tangible and is easily compromised. O
Military writings on tbe advantage of achieving Surprise in an air offensive indicate thai Soviet planners arc thinking oflace and time, andtrength, that the enemy does notthan of strategic surprise Soviet planners probably rule out being able to achieve strategic surprise because of their keen appreciation of NATO's ability to detect preparations and to react quickly.
A surprise would pin down more aircraft at NATO's bases, but it would not necessarily increase the Pact's ability to destroy them NATO has enough concrete shelters to protect about three-fourths of the combai aircraft normally based in Cenlral Europe.until the Pact has large numbers of precision-guided munitions (such as the AS-IO missilehviguided bomb) soluble for attacking shelters, ihose aircraft have considerable protection fromweapons. The main advantageurprise attack would be in crate ting runways and taxiways while some NATO aircraft were still waiting lo take
Soviet planners probably hiivc considered minimizing NATO's warning time byreemptive strike, in which Pact air forces would lake off from their home bases and By ihe most directeir targetstrike, which would make no attempt io suppress NATO's forward air defenses, would give Soviet planners an alternative to devoting the first wave to clearing corridors through those defenses Although Ihis lactic would undoubtedlyarger
Top S
o! NATO's air forces on the ground, il would probably increase Pact aircraft losses, particularly among Ihe relatively vulnerable long-range bombers As long as Soviet planners believe thai Ihey must use iheir long-range bombers in the Air Operation, they arc not likely locenario which omits the suppression of NATO defenses |^
Coordiiuuion of force i
The ability of Warsaw Pact forces to conduct the Air Operation is open to question. It would require tbe precise coordination of multiple sorties by Soviet bombers flying out of the USSR with operations of tbe Soviet and East European tactical air forces and several different air defense forces. Although tbe Pact's physical facilities for command, control, and communications are probably adequate, tbe fullhas not been tested. | |
Command and control deficiencies might not seriously affect the execution of the initial assault, because the participating forces would have only to carry Out one or another of various missions already planned.assaults, however, would demand much more skillful command and control, especially as the results of Ihe firstnd NATO's reaction lo them, demanded changes in targets and tactics} [
An additional problem for the Pact is that its air forces would become less effective as they penetrated deeper into'. because most of iheir tactical aircraft depend for navigationetwork of ground-based control stations They would have to fly high enough to remain within radio liac of sighi of the control network (and thus become more vulnerable to NATO's air defenses) or fly low to increase their chances of surviving (and thus lose contact with their primary navigationhe only Pact tactical attack aircraft that can effectively navigate without such assistance arc the Fencer A, Floggcr D. and Fitterurrently these aircraft make up less titanercent of the tactical aircraft available for operations in Centrallthough thcit numbers arcsteadily. I]
NATO jamming could seriously affect Pactand coordination. Pact air forces generally are dependent on an electronic control system, both for navigating lo distant targets and for conducting aerial intercepts, and this dependence makes them especially vulnerable to electronic courtier measures Pactsystems susceptible to jamming include short-range navigation systems, ground-to-airsystems, the radars used lo vector aircraft in air-to-airhe Dopplcr navigation sysicms aboard ihe Fencer A. Floggcr D. and Fitter D. and the bomb-navigation systems on Soviet
Suppression of NATO Aie Defense The Pact's ability to find and destroy NATO's primary radar sites probably ia adequate to eliminate at least the NAIXJE radar sites, because all of them are fixed. Munitions which Ihe Pact is likely louse against these sites include unguided munitionsariety of antiradtation missilesse of ARMs would reduce the need lo locale individual largetsa task thai would pose some difficulty in the caseans portable and camouflaged facilities like tbe
TACQ
Attacking NATO's HAWK surface-to-air missiles wouldignificantly greater challenge because those tactical aircraft that the Pact would assign to this task arc equipped mainly wilh direct-attackaircrews would have to see the HAWK* before they could strike ihem. This would bemore difficult if NATO were alerted and moved Ihe HAWKs from their peacetime positions Their mobility would probably force the Pact la-search for ihe HAWKs again before each
Recent improvements in Pact reconnaissanceshould increase tbe speed with which strike aircraft could react io intelligence giving the location of HAWK batteries Soviet reconnaissance units in Central Europe now have aircraft (Brewerish bed H) equipped with television Each of these aircraft alsoirect data link to ground control
1 Seeoicdetailedo' Pan unatnliiiu for ihe suppression ol NATO! HAWK defense*ihe Central struma
f" 1
Top 4crel
ions which would be used Io transmit information on newly identified largeis a* ii was gathered. To gathei useful information. however, the Brewers and Fishbeds would have to overfly NATO territory, where they would be exposed to NATO air defenses. Several Soviet aircraft do carry side-looking airborne radar, but il probably does not have sufficient resolution lo locate HAWK sites. f |
The introduction of antiradiation missiles capable of attacking the HAWK's principal engagement radars would significantly improve Pact capabilities loIhe HAWK 'Such ARMs would reduce Ihe need to locale wilh precision those ground-based units whose fire-control radars are emitting signals Instead of suppressing all air defensese selected corridors, aircraft equipped with ARMs could escort the strike aircraft and engage only those HAWK sites that threatened them directly. We expect ARMs of this sort lo be available in the
Tactics of Ikr Airfield Auack
Pact planners appear Io underestimate ihe difficulty of attacking NATO's airfields, and their ladies seem ill conceived These planning factors would probably limn severely tbe success of sach an |
Of theain operating bases lhat NATO normallyeacetime, we believe that> could be attackedingle assault during the Airis assessment is based on the number of LRA and tactical air regiments the Pad would probably commit to airfield attacks und on Pact planning factors indicating that one regimen! of aircraft would be assigned io attack one NATO airfield Paci strategist* thusifficult choice. Our analysts shows lhathree-day period ihey could attack each of NATO's major bases once or could conduct repeated attacks against fewerfor example, ihosc where nuclear delivery aircraft are based. The dcsiic of Pactto reduce NATO'* air nuclear strike potential suggests lhat they would select the latter alternative. Al present. NATO maintainsirfields in Central Europe where nuclear strike aircraft arc based in peacetime and Iwo others where nuclear weapons are stored.
Our analysis of Pact tactics indicates that thenot understand how to maximize Iheof the force committed toEvidence from exercises shows lhat theycommit ihe attacking force against both sheltersinstead of focusing on one or thePact has used munitions
lhal are not weTT suited lor airfield attack and has used 'ineffective delivery technique.
By correcting its employment doctrine, the Pact could far belter exploit its present capabilities for closing runways and could bring more airfields under attackingle sortie. Current deficiencies in Ibe doctrine also prevent the Pact air forces from taking full advantage of the increased potential of the new aircraft and munitions they are now receiving
Analysts shows that if ihe Pact were to strike both the aircraft shelters and the runways of I ingle assault would destroy someheltered" and close three or four runways The runways probably could be reopened withm four hours and fully repaired within approximatelyhis judgment rs based on analysis of ihe amounts and kinds of ordnance various types of Paci aircraft would deliver, the effectiveness of thai ordnance, the accuracy of Pad delivery, and the ability of NATO to repair runways Two more attacks of Ihe same kind would probablyore aircraft and, if dnedcd against the sameirfields, would aggravate the initial damage io the runways but would probably not seriously impede NATO's use of the airfield* f "j
Taas ina miated aa tbe uiunpoo* ihii all rJttftm in occupied ami that the deuraciLOo of ihe inciter aluideiirofs (he
Wieeted aircraft Q
By designing un assault lo crater runways only and employing more effective munitions, tho Pact couldreater number ofur analysis is based oningle sortie Wc believe lhat such an assault could put as many asunways out of operation equivalent to about one-faulth of NATO's main bases foroours, rendering up toercent of NATO's combat aircraft temporarily unusable If Ihe same runways were subjected to two foUowup attacks, they could be closed for several days.
Our analysis shows that an attack aimed solely at destroying shelters would show an equal increase in effectiveness. Three successive assaults against the shelters atirfields could destroyircraft, or aboutercent of NATO'savailable combat aircraft.1
The Pact's potential for airfield attacks should increase substantially hs Backfires continue lo icplacc aging Badgers and at precision-guided munitions areI he moot dramatic change would be in the ability to destroy aircraft in shelters for example, if Pact planners adjusted their tactics to make the most efficient use of the newer aircraft and weapon systems, by thehe Pact would have the potential capacity to destroy up loercentOiicraft in Central Europeeries of three assaults. Its abilitynterdict runways also mould increase. An airfield attack mounted with today's tactic*orce of the sire the Pact currently intends to use could doseunways, whereas the same force using the newer sysicms and belter tactics could chose somen
addition, the damage from each assault would be
greater and would require more time (or repair
Aircrew Profitteney
Pact tactical aircrews generally aic not well (rained for combai in the hostile environment they would probablyhe Air Operation Their naming is stereotyped, lacks realism, and neglects some of tbe potential of their aircraft and weapon sysicms Pact pilots arc not exposed lo the tactics NATO pilots would be ctiwcied to employ, and when they practice
" Theic titumarciumnurircd^
ground attacks the simulated air defense environment is not realistically hostile. Of the trainingact aircrew makes each year, only about one-fourth involve any combai-related
Two other aspects of training could affect theof ihe Air Operation. One is lhat Pact aircrewsimited amount of training for flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long distances. Another is thai (hey have little experience in operating independently. Peacetime training is conducted under strict ground control in order to compensate for Ihe rudimentary navigation instrumentation aboard most Pact tactical aircraft. In operations beyond the range of their control stations, the crews would be ill prepared to seek out and attack airborne NATO aircraft or targets on tbe ground
Another factor prciudioal to tbe success of ihe Air Operation is lhat the Pact mustortion of its force on alert for nuclear operations. Wc estimate that this duty probably requires upf its most experienced taciical aviation aircrews. Consequently, ofilots that would be needed to fly the aircralt available for an initial assault, approximately one-third would be third class. By Pact standards.
third-class pilots are not qualified to fly
missions in darkness or in unfavorable weather.
Wemtkew
Most of the Pact's tactical aircraft require favorable weather conditions Wc judge thai only the Fencer and Backfire can navigate at low altitude and attack targets tn poor visibility, because only they arc csiimatcd lo have full incriial navigation systems and terrain avoidance and bomb-navigation radars. Other Pact aircraft require ceilings of several ihousud. mctcrsand visibilities ofilometers I
Thus, weather conditions could be critical to the success of the Air Operation, which would demand several consecutive days of good wc.iitin Throughout much of Ihe year the skies in Central Europe are so overcast that air operations would be severely degraded. The tabulation below shows ihe percentage
Top Slcrct
lime ihcrc will likely be cloud cover al or below various altitudes in Ccnital Europe for representative months in ihe four seasons:
meter
A ceilingeters or below will probably prevent any aircraft that is not equipped for all-weather operation from participating in long-range operations. When the ceiling iseters, operations are unimpeded. Between these extremes, the weather will have varying effects on aircrafi and weaponsIn sum, tbe uncontrollable variable of weather is one thai could severely degrade the effectiveness of the Air Operation especially while few Pact aircraft are equipped for all-weather
Sortie Rates
The Warsaw Pact's ability to sustain intensive, large-scale offensive air operationseriod of days would be crucialhe success of the Air Operation. We have no direct evidence on thisis. for example, little reliable information on stocks of air munitions or POL in Central Europe. Majorgaps of this sort, as well as meihodological uncertainties, have so far permitted us to make only tentative assessments In peacetime ihe Pact air forces are significantlymostly in ground support and rear set*ices The implications ol this undermanning arc not well understood, but it could reduce significantly ihe Pact's abiht) to sustainons in the laiiial daysar. j j
Lasses in Air-taAir Combat
Pact planners view the air-to-air combat phase of the Air Operation as an opportunity to inflict heavy losses on NATO's interceptor force. Pact planners expect as much asercentI O's losses to occur in aerial engagements. They may be planning to allocate up toperceni of their loialair-to-air missions. | |
Although wc arc unable to formulate an assessmenl of Ihc number of aircraft each side mighl lose in air-to-air combat, we believe lhat the optimism of the Pact is unfounded. We recognize thai ii mjghl be able to outnumber NATO in the air by moreo I. but several factors make it unlikely that the Pact can gam significantly from this imbalance
NATO's interceptors,s and. are superior lo the MlG-2ls andhey would be engaging.
NATO's, aircrews are better trained
NATO has the advantage in command and
Coatcliasions
Given the present Warsaw Pact capabilities and tactical concepts, wc estimate that the Airwhich only conventional weapons are used would nol inflict decisive damage on NATO's air and air defenset probably would have the following impact'
- Il would putlarge part of NATO*
ground-based air defense controlrs. ihe NADGE and TACS radar systems Their loss would hamper the offensive and defensive use of NAIO'sair forces, but the I" IA airborne warning and control system would continue to provide command and control
would probably cause little other damage to NATO's air forces or airfields. The Pact piobably could notignificant numberould lose more aircraft than NATO would.
probably would not eliminate the capability of NATO's air forces to respond with nuclear weapon* Any loss of nuclear-capable aircraft in the milial operation could reduce NATO's ability to provide direct nuclear support to local ground commanders, but wc believe such losses would have Imlc effect on
"ssmcnl doc? not cuntrflei ihe cooinbunon oil heground-based air detente* lo the artiioemcni of an lunermrin
Top
Top Aecret
NATO's ability lo execute the SACEUR Priority Strike Plan. Aircraft losses would have to approachercent of the nuclear-capable force before the Priority Strike Plan would be endangered. The chances lhat an Air Operation could inflict losses of this magnitude are minimal even under optimum operational conditions.
In sum, the Warsaw Pact plans toeries of assaults based on the Air Operation concept, with the general objective of achieving air superiority. We are not certain of the minimum damage the Pact would hope to inflict and the maximum losses it would be willing to accept. We judge that Pact planners estimate too highly both their capabilities and tbe probable results of their Air Operation. This ovcropiimum rcsulls from their misconception of the effectiveness of bombing raids on NATO airfields
Appendix A
Warsaw Pad Capabilities for HAWK Suppression
of the factors that would affect the success of the Air Operation is (he ability of the Pact air forceauppress NATO's air defenses. This appendix presenis an analysis of the Pact's capability to counter NATO's HAWK surfacc-to-aii missile defenses and describes ihe kinds of information we used in ourbe model enabled us to quantify the effectiveness of HAWK-suppression attacks, under various conditions, in reducing ihe number of Pact aircraft lost. In an actual assault, this effectiveness would depend heavily on the Pact's ability to provide the attack force with precise information on the location of HAWK units. The Pact's ability to do this was not evaluated in this analysis!
Attack Scenario
The attack scenario in our analysis assumesajor poriion of the Paci Air Operation is aimedentral corridor through the midsection of West Germany, where most of NATO's airwell at US air and air defenselocated. To attack thai area, we believe ihe Pact planner* may assign as much asercent of their total force. Incur analysis weircraft to that attack This iserceni of theircraft that we estimate would be available, assuming limited rein-force mem from the Soviet Union.hows the NATO targets and our postulated allocation of Pact forces against them:iscussion of iheoptions, see
Our hypothetical force flew two lypes of attack. In one (which wc considered for purposes of comparison) we assumed the Pact would make no attempt to suppress ihe NATO HAWKs but would orderircraft to
Table 3
Allocation of Pact
Strike Forces In the TACOS Simulations
Targets
otTaigeu,
Aircraft Committed
Strife
HAWK sites
strike
I? ECM Mpport
Strike
HAWK sites
CM suppon
radar sites
strike
M support
airfields
strike S* ECM wppoci
attack targets in the rear areas of West Germany. In the other weirst wave would attack ihe forward HAWK stiesllustrates the forward HAWK suppression attack andhe primary strikes (that is. the followup strikes against olher|
In all cases, we postulated thai ihe attacking force wouldariety of penetration tactics, consistent wilh the missions and flight characteristics of the particular aircraft involved The tactical strike and ECM support aircraft were directed to penetrate NA TO's air defenses al an altitudeeters, wilh an ingress speednots and egress speednots The medium bombers were directed to flyeters also butlightly slowere bombers' fighter escorts were assigned higher
P
'-'tildes, with some coming in as higheters
fop Secret
Simulated Suppression of NATO's Forward HAWKs by Pact Aircraft
eider iain lacas on lit* tutraj nn*,iW hom stows HAWK tkti wrhoVcar/afar, wtick win mt atttcMACOSa* ndae ttlrt and HiiitUs ibawo. on7tb.tr hand, anthattftstlor iitavlirtdattatt; tHut HAW radars ami atdttldlMrs Inside ami ealfda IM antral ce/rnhe.
AWK tillf HAWK aittipeulioml iklitktiRghtM-booHMir ilUttt
,
7
BiriMMcV
<
S/crcl
Top ^fitcl
..
la eider it tmfhatii* the toots aa ihe tmril taintat. this itevn shows HA WK sites aotside He ctrihtai. which ware oat attniedam TACOS umolahea.rain bin and airfields ShewD. aa the other html, an oalf those that we chase tat ttasotatad atutk; other NATO radar* tod airfields exist. Mil mite and outside the tatitnl Cturidoi
hawk Bit* Phi hawk liMsiitd uoarseialiaavicks BomB"
.ft
West
CENTRAL
Germany
Ausfia
decho&lovnki;
Methodology
To simulate Ihe inlet action of the Pact attack force with the defending force of NATOe used the TACOShis model recorded the activity of each battle and performed the calculations needed toetailed report.
We simulated the interaction repeatedly, putting in alternative datavaluate the effect of three variables:
test the effect of ECM. we used two sets of estimates of Ihc likelihoodAWK missile will shootact aircraft, an undegradedegraded set The degraded set assumed that ihc Pact's ECM would halve the HAWKs undegraded engagement probability of. The single-shot P, for both acts of estimates are summarized in table 4.
" To test the effect of different air-dehvered muni-lions, we varied the P,ingle attacking aircrafiingle hawk site. We used three diflcrent P, figures o simulate unguided munitionso simulate two classes of precision-guided munitions
test ihc effect of HAWK responses, we put in two differentercent rate loorce attacked with utile or no warningercent rate to represent full alert (In both cases wc assumed thatercent of the sites on alert were unable to engage Pact aircraft because of equipment failures.)
The model wasotal ofimes, with varied parameters Inariations wc assumed lhat the Pact preceded its primary attackuppression attack againstKs. and we varied the input to measure the effects of thai suppression under different conditions. In four other variations we assumed that the attacks were conducted without suppression. (Each of theariations of Ihe attack simulation was run five limes to increase our confidence in the results andeduce the effects of statistical
Wc also evaluated, although in less detail, tbe ability of the Pact's conventionally armed surface-to-surface missiles to suppress the HA WKs. This evaluation consisted of calculating the lethality of ihe Scud-B,ndgainst the HAWt
> summarizes Ihc missileristics used in thisur calculations showed such low kill probabilities thai we did notACOS simulationefenseattack by those missiles.]^
Results of Ihe Analysis
Suppression of HAWKs by Aircraftummarizes ihc results of the TACOS simulations, expressing (in terms of Pact aircraft losses) the effectiveness of HAWK suppression attacks under various conditions It shows the numbers of Pact aircraft lost, of HAWK sites destroyed, and of missiles fired by the forward IIA WKs Tablesing the same data, shows Pad lossesercent of the attacking force. The number of aircrafi in thessigned tn HAWK suppressionith other missions) and the number of HAWK sites) were held constant in all cases These simulations permitted us to draw several conclusions q
In all cases, the Pact suppression attacks reduced ihc capability of the HAWKs and thus reduced ihe Pact's aircraft losses Suppression was most effective when the HAWKs were on fullis, the alert HAWKs scored twice as many kills when undisturbed as they did when they were bothered by suppression. On ihc other hand, suppression was relatively(in terms of reducing Pact aircrafi losses) when (he HAWKs were not onis theirreduced their effectiveness so greatly lhat ibe Pact's use of suppression became far less significant. These conclusions assume (he use of ihe Pad's current air-delivered munitions: we judge thai ihc use of precision-guided munitions would make suppression effective under any conditions q
Table*
CrfKliTcnm erf Paid Kkcinmu Warfare System '
NATOactSmtJc-Sboc
byECM
by Pact ECM
llilM II
is.
Vk Ir m
fa
km
.61
4ft
.14
X)
4JO0 wwm* (ahWnaVi
i
-
air
The efiecliveneti ol Paei ECM ii cir*erms of tbe HAWK untie ihoi pfobibilily of lull afainn Pacthhovi KM oquir-wm. The uod-naood (el orr. mlmilct wit deri.rd fro-, oaWauoaa ol ihr HAWK perterauDce ux afCM canroaM TheartCM hah* ikebe floras uadrr -Waksfa iirret" indicate (be HAWK f,a(le aircraft if laoor more aircraft air wiihln Ihe lama radar HtatMion cell
I*"
Table 5
Technical Dala on Selected Soiltl Missiles
M i Ri"ft Actuary-CE* WarheadReUab-Ui,
Submauiruoa. 'ml
Tboalpw. Uwor ibe aa.ramilfr armedMlat* ^tUikeiinder o3 (be Pact irjtfci aac igi.ni lit HAWK Theurculaf error probable (fir')ere i. Tiieawird at two thirds of ihenailroom rinse Ihe warhead eiiimain for ihem baled on euimaici of theachcJthcsutmiaiiiiioni wasaaavmed to weighnda ntut area ofIricmrwaiM >MAI FT of ihe HAWK
5
1 up Aeerrt
Mil o
Result* of TACOS Simulation of Ibe HAWK Suppression Engagement
HAWK
Rate
IIAWkrr
has
has
has
has
M
( M
ECM
M
Air OfnattM WKhimln
f, Aaaaaw1
lot) instrike
otto-np suike
MM Mat
t
npnrkd by (coin) HAWKs
gaaM4
kM in wprinMon strike
ktst inii.nkc
sties killed
c.pended by forward HAWKs
Ata mia
hut In luppressloostrike
lost ia followup strike
sites killed
*
-
.IniAWK.
Air Oprrahaw Wilbawt HAWK fajawmlin
Asrcafl lost
loss rate of aircraft attacking ihe HAWKsaboul twice lhat of aircraft in the when ihe suppression was conducted againstalert HAWK force and without Pact(he HAWKs' efficiency was degraded eitheroreduced alert rate, thesuffered about the same losses as ihc rest ofIn Iwo cases the simulation showed lhat theIhe HAWKsreater loss raleentire force suffered-in_aitacks made wiihoutat suppression^
I he HA WK-suppreision assault did nol ensure that more aircrafi would actually complete the primary
mission lor example, ifircraft were assigned to the first-wavetherefore becamefor Ihe followup (Sen suppression of HA WKs
i
would save some of ihc followup aircrafi. but fewer lhannly after several HAWK suppressionwould an increasing number of Pad aircrafi survive Ihe followup mission and be available for subsequent missioos.| |
When we put in improvements in ihe effectiveness of Ihc attackers' munitions, the ralr of kill against HAWK and the survivability of the primary strike force increased. This effect was most pronounced with the increase in munition P,nd wus less significant wilh further increases. The samein munition effectiveness, however, did little to increase the survivability of the HA WK-suppression force, these aircraft suffered most of their losses before they reached thetherefore before they could bring their improved munitions into piayj^
If
expenditure rales noted in ihe various TACOS runs indicate lhat HAWK units in the field wild three missiles per launcher would have enough missileshree-day massive air operation Indmdual units might exhaust their initial supplyay or two. however, and might need more; these could be supplied from the rear or from nearby units which were notengagement range of the suppression corridors.[_
The TACOS simulation showed aircrafi lossesby the primary strike force lo be greatest in two situations attacking targets in areas where the HAWKs had not been suppressed and penetrating ibe HAWK bell at other than low altitude Losses in ihe first category are notplanners recognize thai some of iheir tactical forces may have lo fly strikes into unsupprcssed areas and apparently arc willing lo accept the losses, t
The high loss rates noted among aircrafi penetrating ai medium and high altitudes were somewhat artificiala product of Ihc engagement logic of TACOS -but ihey demor.sirate an important pent. Some Pact laclical aircraft will be unable lo penelraic Ihc belt at low altitude Air superiority fighters, which are searching out and engaging NATO interceptors, are particularly likely to comee readily engaged by HAWKs In the largei-rich environment that the Air Operaiion presents to ihe HAWK defenses, lowaltitudc medium bombers may be able to slipihe expense of Ihe tactical fighters al higher altitudes In all our simalations. the leu rale of medium bombers wj* much lower than that of fighters flying ai higher altitudes Soviet planners haveIhe merits of saturation and may be witling lo sacrifice tactical aircrafi (which can be replaced) in order to conserve theirA bombci forces.actic would force the HAWK defenses to establish priorities lor targets j |
Tc*Se/ei
;rct
of HAWKs by Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Our analysis of attacks against HAWK sites by conventionally armed surface-to-surface missiles showed thai they were ineffective. The Soviets' best missile for this role, theas found toingle-shot P, of onlynd those of the olderndoumulative P,5ingle HAWK battery control center, the Pact would have to launch nine.rcud-
The most important limitation of surface-to-surface missiles is their inaccuracy, which accounted for nonkillsercent of the lime in the case of ihe0 perceni for thendercent for the Scud-B. Tbe warheads for these missiles appear to be adequate, however: targets were killedercent of the times when the missile succeeded in pulling the warhead over the target [
Conclusions
With good intelligence, and with tbe Pact's current munitions inventory, an Air Operation attack could destroyoercent of NATO's HAWKshree-day period. However, such an attack could cosi the Pact air forces as manyircraft (or about one-fourth of those allocated to HAWK suppression over the threef ibe attacking aircraft had precision-guided munitions, they could probably destroyoerceni of the HAWKs, while their own loss rate would be aboul Ihe same, j
The Pact may choosese surface-to-surface missiles in the HAWK suppression role, but aircraft appear lo be far bciicr suited for (hit job. Missiles are more dependent on precise target location information than are manned aircrafi. and even with such information theiro great thai multiple launches are required toill. I
jo
Appendix B
Warsaw Pact Capabilities for Conrentional Air Attacks Against NATO Airfields
appendix describes Paci plans for attacking NATO airfields wilh conventional munition* and describes our analytical meihod ot* assessing Pact capabilities to destroy aircraft protected in shelters and to interdict runways It presents an estimate of Pact capabilities under three circumstances
Using the force wc believe tbe Pact currently has lined up for use against NATO airfields and what we believe to be current Pact taciics
Using the present Pact force, but employing tactics modified in ways we believe would enhance the effectiveness of an airfield attack
Using the force we estimate lhat the Pact will havelus Ihc modified employment concepts. Q
Pact Planning for Airfield Attacks
The following picture of Soviet planning for airfield attack emerges from an analysis of Pact military writings and exercises'
Toingle airfield, ibe Soviets would employ an entire air regiment, whatever the type of regiment. Regiment-sue attacks would vary in intensity from approximatelyircraft for tactical and LRA bomber regiments to 3ft aircraft for laclical fightcr-boinber regiments.
Within Ihc attacking regiment, only someoercent of the aircrafi would be used for the actual attack on airfield facilities. Of these, one-half (aboutercent of the total regiment) would be used to strike Ihcunway and the other half to attack aircrafi on ihc ground. The remainingoercent of the regimcnl's aircraft would be given support roles, including clectionic warfare (EW) support,of air defenses at the airfield, und weather and
prcstrike reconnaissance. (Although Pact writings have portrayed other airfield-related facilitiesstorage, maintenance, electronics, and fuel supply and distributiontargets, wc have no evidence that these arc included as targets in Pact exercise scenarios.)
The Pact's principal munitions for airfield attack continue togg bombs Typically, runways would be attackedg general purpose bombs, while soft targets (unprotectedfor example) would be attackedgg cluster and fragmentation bombs. Advanced munitions designed specifically for airfield attack, such as runway or aircraft shelter peneirators, have not been noted and are probably not in the operational inventory.
The combat bomb load of LRA's primary medium bombers- Badger and Blinder -may be no greater thang. This is significantly lower than the maximum bomb load capability,g for bolh aircraft. The difference probably reflects Sovicl operational planning, which sacrifices bomb tonnage tn order to increase maneuverability and low-altitude penetration capability j
Attack Objectives
The airfield attack in Ihe Pad Air Operation would be intended to deny NATO the use of ils aircraft It could do so by destroying or damaging ibe aircraft on the ground, by interdicting runways, or by disrupting logistic support and command and control. Of these possibilities. Pact planners appear to focus on the first two
Sheltered Aircraft Destruction ofihcllcrcd aircrafi is very difficult, NATO currenlly hasircrafi shelters in Central Europe, enough to proteci aboutercent of the aircrafi it maintains in the area. If we assume that some of those aircrafi would be airborne during the Pact's Air Operation, il follows lhat nearly all of the NATO combat aircrafi on the ground arc likely to be in shelters.
A typical NATO aircraft shelter (hangarettc) consistshell in the shapealf-cylinder abouteterseters high (atndeters long; it is made ofkilopascal concreteentimeters thick and has an aluminum Was!entimeters thick. The hangarcttcs usually are grouped in squadron areas. Each NATO main operating base has two or three squadron areas, each wilhoheltersquadron area typically contains one shelter for0 square meters. q
NATO Airbase
Runway Dimensions:
elcs
asmoice
[mt >li' SO wit.molwj
ypt'ol SATO "lain opt'aitnt bate for thrri squadronl
oiol of J* eombaiai out runwaj andaieartiirt, or ihtlit'i
Air era II Shelter Area Dimensionsquadronhalntr*
Squadron area 2- htfaers
tSfeiHrinr* 3
A shelteicd ain I'.tit can bedcsiroycd or damaged by blast or by fragments, from weapons ihui haveiV and peihapa pcnelraicd ihe sheltet shell or from weapons lhai have exploded in front of Ihe shelter door.omb as smallg can daheltered aircraft by striking the shell,last sufficient lohelter door mayeapong or more. Although shelters arc more vulnerable to lafeer weapons, iheir vulnerabilityby onlyoercent as the bomb weight increase*ercentherefore an
attack with many small weapons would probably be more effective than an attackew large
Inlrrdicliag Rmmwmn
Tbe number of bombs required to interdict the flight surfaceATO airfield would depend on such factors as the number of runways, their dimensions and construction, the type of aircraft using them, and
Aircraft Shelter Vulnerabilily
i0 lawnuidca
mi: i
5-J4 iBlll4
w J
500
Aairml
HajMai
u. 'Often.I
Ihran airattaek wouldan&miit land an al'ieajl imlaVin imirtait ifrwf r.hr Ivraunt weight o/ ihe Pan waihiad
,hewm aerond*.
1 nn/ScCfCi
sire of the bombsypical NATO airfield has one reinforced coocfetcpproximatelymeters long, andeters wide It is made up of concrete slabs poured in place and is builtravel and sand baseoentimeters deep.
Runways are interdicted when their surfaces are so cratercd that aircraft cannot land or take off Craters may be clustered around one or more aiming points or distributed randomly over tbe entire runway surface. The intent is to ensure that no intact part of the runway is long or wide enough Tor takeoff or landing. The length and breadth of clear surface required depends on the type of aircraft using the runway. NATO's principal aircraftinimum dear width of 15
metersinimum clear length
mctcrv |
Appropriate weapons for runway interdictionpurpose bombs, rockets, andwith time-delayed fuses. While largerbigger craters, this increase is most rapidg; weapons heavier than that are notcfficieni in this rolehowslike sheltcis. are most effecuyclylarge numbers of small weapons j
of recent and projected improvements. Theseinclude the better conventional bombingof the new generation of Pact fighter-bombers.
tbe widespread availability of precision-guidedin the tactical air forces. arhLlbc replacement of
Badgers by Backfires in LRA.
The sire and composition of the Pact force and its weapons pay load and accuracy of the delivery were key elements in our calculations. Given the payload capacity of the delivery aircraft, it is easy to estimate the amount of ordnance that could be delivered, but calculating accuracy involves such important variables as the type of ordnance used, the aircraft altitudes and speedial lime of delivery, aircrew proficiency, and the fire-control systems of the aircraft.hows the ordnance type, delivery conditions, and delivery errors that we used in out calculations of runway closures and shelter destruction. IWrvery errors were based on technical studies of each of the major aircraft oonsid-crca.Q
s an adaptationcthod-ssing Pact air-delivered munitions
I
Interdiction of Runways. To determine the probability of runway closure wc used "MethodWeapon* and Sticks of Weapons Against Runways,"j
Gtmerml
To assess the Pact capability for conventional air attacks on NATO airfields, we calculated the damage an air regiment could inflict on runways and sheltered aircraft This appendia describes our analysis of tbe probability that such an attack wouldunway and of the probable number of aircraftpresumably aircraft- it could destroy. Wc evaluated the damage level to be expected Iromegiment-sire attack, to determine the Pact's capability to attack NATO airfields with current equipment and methods and also to reflect the effects
Destruction of Aircraft Sbdler. In calculating ihe number of aircraft shelters an air regiment could destroy, we considered attacks aimedshelters and general area attacks. I
For an aimed attack wc assumed the Pact would use highly accurate weapons such as theaser-guided missile. Wc calculated the number of shelters that such an attack could destroy by determining the
r mi AS to iBMiguidcd missile
itelivery pan and multiplying this probability by the numbci of passes thai could be made Mathematically this is represented
where
Sd represents the number of shelters destroyed. ph.. probabilityitingle weapon.
he number of weapons per aircrafi.
the number of aircraft in ihe attack, and
R, the reliability of ihe weapon
Calculations ofonsidered the accuracy of the weapon and the vulnerable area of the shelter (this areaunction of ihe size of the weapon's warhead) We did not consider collateralamage caused to another sheltereapon that missed ihc one at which it was aimed I 1
libit 8
where:
cprescnis the number of shelters destroyed.
Ihe number of weapons per aiicraft.
St the number of aircraft in the attack.
he percentage of weapons dropped in the (argei area.
a. the sum of Ihe vulnerable areas of all ihe shelters within Ihe squadron shelter area, and
a, ihe total squadion shelter area.
Ihe percentage of weapons Landinge large! areaunction of the accuracy of the delivery and the width and length of the squadron shelter area and was calculated usingonograms. I
Assumptions
In applying these formutas to our study of expected darnagc levds. we mack three major assumptions thaistrike force would suffer no attrition: that the numerous operational factors, which must bein any employment of combat aircraft, would be favorable to the attacker. and that the attack would cause no collateral damage. | |
In an actual air assault of the scape envisioned, the attacking regiment could lose fromercent to as much asercent of itsand such attrition would reduce significantly the number of bombs it could actually deliver. In omitting such attrition from our calculations, we arriveamage level more favorable to the Pact lhan would actually be the case.
The operational environment is also assumed to favor the attacker. For example, wc assume that all Pact aircrews navigate successfully and acquire iheiral the airfield and that they all arerained and disciplined to deliver strikes with the best accuracy inherent in their bombing systems- j j
We ignored the question of the collateral damage any air attack would cause. The methodology was used only to measure damage to runways and shelters, which appear to be the primary focusact airfield attack. In any actual assault, bombs that missed their intended target could disrupt operation* by wounding or killing personnel and damaging supply facilities, fuel distribution systems, or other airfield elements The methodology also does not consider the psycho logical impact of such an aiiack
Rttmltt of tk* Ammlytii
We calculated IhcATO airfield would sufferegimental-size attack by two different Pactfighter-bombers and medium bombers Wc assumed the forcese directedunways and sheltershroughhow the level of damage each attacking force could achieve against each type of target, using different modes of weapon delivery.
Fighter-Bomber I'ffccti.iocss. On the basis of the damage they could do. the Pact's laic-model fighter-bombers are the greatest ihrealATO airfield, although they would normally carry smaller pay loads than the current Soviet bombers- This i* because they have better delivery accuracy and precision-guided weapons)
The newest fighter-bomber* are equipped withweapon delivery system withaccuracy than that of the olderto estimates,ive-bombing mode itsystem errorwhich could equate to a
il system accuracyombat accuracyomparison withmil system accuracy of older Pact fighter-bombers suggests that the newer ones may be able to do the same amount of damage with significantly fewer aircraft. For example, an attack with fully loaded Floggcr Ds would do about four limes as muchangarctlc attack and twice as much damageunway as the tame attack with fully loaded Filter As.
The precision-guided weapon* lhat they havewill greatly increase the potential of (hefighter-bombers For example, with themissile.ircraft could do asas lOOoklci fighter-bombers. Thehas been operational since Iheittle to ioiprove tbe Warsaw Pact's capabilityairfields This is because its CEP is 'as compared tothe
n addition, theas delivery constraints that wouldandicapostile air defense environment The delivery aircraft can gu.de only oneissileime and must remain in the vicinity of the target during the entire period of guidance. Toull load of AS-7s. the aircraft would have to make four separate passes ai ihc target.
tn listen mns.st* ul three ma|oiabitation component basedhe SVODshon ranee navigation lyucm.an aulomalH eoairal cumponeru.apon delivery cumponcni whichbclacx includes upontcici and> heaeliapdwpUi [_
"Thisut hlsjeuuj lent lo the accuracy of early varum* oltte rVJ Corsair II
Secret
Top Secret
Tabic 9
Pad Capability To Attack Runways
Eaiployed
Needed ToAcfcioe CloMreProbabililyofOB
by Individual Aircraft RecifoeM-Site Sorties
D/Filter P
Backfire
Fencer A
Floggcr D/ Finer l>
adger/Blindec
Finer A
AS-IO
csrb ioi'J
Mi ii mum bomb toad
Miximum1
Maxiitr.tr limti load
Maximum bomb I
AS :
Maximam bomb load
fonts' tofib bid
27
10
12
11
210
10
2W
10
060
I .0
nc
I 0>
.50
i'.;0
tableihe number of individual aircraft sorties and legimeiu-sueaglh sorties needed to achieve an SO-pe/eentof runway cloture, wilh mac different aireraft/munUKHi* combiniiiom and either visual or norrnsual delivery. Theeotriesied ia rank order in terms of mailmum dosirueiioo actuevnbleimeni-titc auack in vinaalegiment of Fitler Ai Of Ds or flower Ds ii assumed to numberirike aircralt. all ether rrgimcoli ID
indicates no cspabiliiv.
Bomber Kffectiieness. Wilh Ihe Pact's current medium bomber force, the LRA component is limited essentially to interdictingegiment of Badgersaximum bombload optimized for attacking runways) hasperccnt chance ofunway in one attack,aximum payload optimized for attacking shelters, it could not destroy more than aboulhis capability will improve appreciably, however, as Ihe Badcers are replaced by Backfires. At (he ranges involved in attacks against NATO airfields tn Central Luropc, the Backfires should be able to deliver about twice the nayload l
Number of Sorties Required.ndhow the number of sorties needed topecified probability of lunway closure and shelter destruction We assumed that the number of aircraft delivering ordnance per sortie would depend on tbe type of aircraft in thes follows.
iller A. Finer D, oregiment.
egiment.
ackfire. Badger, and Blinder regiment]
Inn
TtHe 10
Pact Capability To Attack Shelters
t apahilllies
Our estimate of the Pact's capabilities fat aair attackTOaii fields isint shown the damage we believe the current attack force could inflict, using the current tactics, and our estimate of the damage to be expected should the Pact modify its tactics The [able also shows our estimate of Ihc potential capabilities of (he same force using equipment that should be available5 and using both ihe current and the modified tactics. Our analysis of tactics included three target options and force allocations strike aircrafi evenly divided between ihc runways and shelters at an airfield; all strike aircraft attacking runways only; and allshelters only-|
Current Capability
The Pact's current capability against NATO airfields would be little morcibap harassment If the four scenarios described earlier are indicative of Pactregiment attackingle some would close only three or four runways and destroy aboutheltered aircraft. The closed runways could probably be reopened within four hours and fully repairedours This estimate assumes thaierceni of the bombs dropped would hit the runway and that each of the airfieldstandard NATO rapid runway repair kit (capable of repairing three bomb cratersg bombs in fouro additional sorties against the same runways would increase ihe damage bui would probably do little to further curtail NATO's ability to use the runways Q
lop/iecret
lable 11
Capabilities of Pact Air Operation Assault
of NATO Airfields Allatxed
Taifei Onlroo
may-.
Closed
Snellen Ifci'.royeil
nad. force* of eurreM
Current lactic* MceUfled ucuet_ Mod tiled uciiea
and
Runways call
Shelienonly
110
CurrcnjjjCiie*
__
Modified
if!
10
Runways only Snellen only
table shows the damagebe expected from an Ai. olZ *orik by an attack fore, of IJ medium bombc tMm
Shicbcenbc,W^"tr Badge, bomberombai bomb loadOO *(
An attack of three sorties under current conditions would probably destroy no mote thanATO aircraft. We assume an attack forceircraft, wilh each aircraft making three sorties. If the loss rate of this forceercent, its losses would exceed the number of NATO aircraft it could desuoy.
Potential Capability of Current Foreet The Pact could significantly improve its capability by concentrating it* attacks on either runways o. shelters, using optimum munitions, and spreadingpi-mcntsreater number of NATO airfields!
The most significant increase in damage level would result from concentration on runways Wilh an appro-pnate selection of munitions, an initial assaultorce ofegiments should be able to close as many asunways, each with someomb impacts By repairing selected craters. NATO repair crews could conceivably reopen these runways withinoours. However, the damage from subsequent sorties, when combined with any unrepaired damage from the first, would probably close the repaired mnway again, this time for days (The actual repair lime would dependumber of factors and therefore is extremely difficult to cakulaic. figurehows estimates of repair times based on three different
repairbe prolonged closure ofunways could tcsuli in the loss ofoercent of NATO's airignificant loss, especially if the runways were those used by NATO's nuclear strike aircraft .Q^
An attack concentrated against shelters only would increase the damage level almost as much Three sorties could destroyircraft, or
aboulercent of NATO's strength in Central
F.urope
pability The replacement of Badgers by Backfires could substantially increase the Pact capability to destroy NATO aircraft shelters An attack byf Backfires and three of fighter-bombers- -in three sorties could destroyircraftercent of NATO's aircralt in Central Furopc) Kvcnoss rate ofcrceni, (he Paci would still achieve an exchange ratioATO aircraft for one of its
This sameegiment attack force also could attackunways and close overercent of them. Three soriics in two days would close Ihe runwayseriod of days Q
Figuie 11
Time Required To Repair Runway Craters
TAilfa-wtiomaleA riff llmtlwm oftohe refrnJ Ur >krra
gi4 rVixalF HI mufAM-2Wiw
iimwiturn'rapM laaBayw
or"fome Mi)MItolle*eli to reflect the
umceiiaiMit lhat ihr peutrairre* /roubleamaged mc'mxueoltnlatttm* oitimradequate (oac
ond equipment are awuiable. y
Original document.
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